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I. A Neglected Aspect
Tax compliance has been studied in economics by analysing the individual decision of a
representative person between paying and evading taxes. The literature has been shaped by the
pathbreaking contribution by ALLINGHAM and SANDMO (1972), with the consequent
extensions by, among others, KOLM (1973) and SRINIVASAN (1973). They are all a specific,
and particularly important, application of BECKER'S (1968) economic theory of crime. The
present state of the art has been summarised and critically discussed by ANDREONI, ERARD
and FEINSTEIN (1998) in their extensive survey on "Tax Compliance".1
The approach is, however, faced with various problems, even when the models are extended
to include endogenous labour supply, or consider the repeated nature of the reporting decision:
"... complex and confounding effects are not limited to complicated models – even within the
simple approach ... we cannot predict the effects of all policy parameters. Moreover, when
such predictions can be obtained, they often depend on the thin reed of the third derivative of
utility functions and on inelastic labor supply" (ANDREONI ET AL. 1998: 824). In particular, an
increase in the tax rate has a theoretically ambiguous effect in most models (but see YITZHAKI
1974), yet both experimental, as well as econometric, research consistently finds that higher
tax rates are associated with greater evasion. Even more importantly, an increase in fines
                                                
1. Other surveys on the subject are e.g. POMMEREHNE (1985), HESSING, KINSEY, ELFFERS and WEIGEL (1988),
ROTH, SCHOLZ and WITTE (1989), PYLE (1990), COWELL (1990) or SLEMROD (1992). The extensive
literature on the hidden, shadow or underground economy is closely related and starts with the same
theoretical premises. See e.g. TANZI (1982), FREY and POMMEREHNE (1984), GAERTNER and WENIG (1985),
FEIGE (1989), POZO (1996), SCHNEIDER and ENSTE (2000) or FREY and SCHNEIDER (2000).
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discourages evasion.2 This corresponds to the thrust of the economics of crime and offers an
important avenue for tax policy. But this effect becomes theoretically ambiguous with elastic
labour supply. Empirically, studies find that expected punishment is rarely statistically
significant and, if it is, the effect is of quite a small magnitude.3
A major puzzle is that most theoretical approaches greatly overpredict non-compliance
(ANDREONI ET AL. 1998: 855). In their article with the revealing title "Why do people pay
taxes?", ALM, MCCLELLAND and SCHULZE (1992: 22) state: "A purely economic analysis of
the evasion gamble implies that most individuals would evade if they are "rational", because it
is unlikely that cheaters will be caught and penalised." Indeed, under the prevailing
magnitudes obtained in the United States for the probability of being caught and the size of
the fines imposed, individuals optimally declare no income. Arrow-Pratt measures of risk
aversion of more than 30 (!) must exist in order to account for the present compliance rate, but
existing field evidence suggests a range of between one and two. The same has been found for
Switzerland.4 One of the solutions to this puzzle or anomaly has been to accept the existence
of an intrinsic motivation to pay taxes, which has sometimes been called "tax morale".5
However, most studies treat "tax morale" as a black box without discussing or even
considering how it might arise or how it might be maintained. It is usually perceived as being
part of the meta-preferences of taxpayers and used as the residuum in the analysis capturing
unknown influences to tax evasion. The more interesting question then is which factors shape
the emergence and maintenance of tax morale. Studies by POMMEREHNE and WECK-
HANNEMANN (1996) and FREY (1997a) show that tax evasion at the Swiss cantonal level is the
lower, the stronger political participation rights in the sense of direct democratic decision-
making like referenda and initiatives are developed. Tax morale appears to be the higher the
more directly taxpayers can influence tax laws and tax rates, but also the rules of the tax game
                                                
2. In particular, an increased probability of detection is more effective in reducing tax evasion than higher
punishment. This point has been mentioned to us by a referee.
3. For laboratory experiments, see ALM, JACKSON and MCKEE (1992), for statistical studies e.g. WITTE and
WOODBURY (1985), DUBIN and WILDE (1988), BERON, TAUCHEN and WITTE (1992), DUBIN, GRAETZ and
WILDE (1990) for American data, and POMMEREHNE and FREY (1992) for Swiss data.
4. For the U.S., see GRAETZ and WILDE (1985), SKINNER and SLEMROD (1985) or ALM ET AL. (1992), for
Switzerland POMMEREHNE and FREY (1992).
5. Thus, for example, GRAETZ and WILDE conclude on the basis of the Internal Revenue Service's Taxpayer
Compliance Maintenance Programme (1985: 358) that "...the high compliance rate can only be explained in a
satisfactory way either by taxpayer’s (...) commitment to the responsibilities of citizenship and respect for the
law or lack of opportunity for tax evasion". Accordingly, the observed falling tax compliance has been
attributed to the erosion of tax ethics by GRAETZ, REINGANUM and WILDE (1986) and many other authors
(see e.g. SCHWARTZ and ORLEANS 1967, LEWIS 1982, ROTH, SCHOLZ and WITTE 1989, PYLE 1990a,
SLEMROD 1992).
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in general. Taxpayers perceive their civic duty more strongly, if they are directly involved in
political decisions of content instead of solely electing representatives on a regular basis.
This paper looks at tax compliance from a different perspective. It therewith attempts to
overcome some of the shortcomings mentioned and to add to the explanation of the negative
relationship between tax evasion and political participation rights. It focuses on how the tax
authorities treat taxpayers. The relationship between the two actors is taken to involve an
implicit or "psychological" contract. The more strongly the political participation rights are
developed, the more important this contract is, and the higher tax morale is. The existence and
survival of this tax contract requires certain behaviour on the part of the two parties
concerned. In particular, the tax authorities must acknowledge and support the contract with
the taxpayers by acting in a respectful way towards them, but also by preventing honest
taxpayers from being exploited in the process. The need to act in such a way is stronger in
democracies with institutions of popular initiatives and referenda than in purely representative
democracies. Thus, the paper considers some completely different instruments of tax policy
compared to the more traditional analysis.
Our empirical analysis employs a unique data set of tax authorities' behaviour in Switzerland,
allowing cross-section estimates across the 26 cantons with widely varying tax systems and
tax rates.6 The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section II discusses the
theoretical background. Section III presents the data collected by us and empirical evidence on
the relationship between the respectful treatment of taxpayers by tax authorities and the extent
of voter participation rights. In Section IV, evidence on differences between the punishment of
basic rule violations in direct and representative cantons is discussed, while Section V contains
some empirical results on the different treatment of minor violations of the tax code by the tax
authorities in direct and representative democratic cantons. A synthesis is offered in Section
VI.
II. Theoretical Background
The relationship between taxpayers and tax authorities can be modelled as an implicit or
relational contract (see e.g. AKERLOF 1982). It thus involves strong emotional ties and
loyalties, and goes well beyond transactional exchanges (see e.g. WILLIAMSON 1985). Social
psychologists (SCHEIN 1965, ROUSSEAU and MCLEAN PARKS 1993) have been using this
concept for a long time, calling it a "psychological" contract to set it clearly apart from formal
contracts, which are obeyed because the parties respond to the explicit and material sanction
previously agreed upon. Psychological contracts have been successfully used to analyse
relationships within the firm (e.g. OSTERLOH and FREY 2000).
                                                
6. We thus also respond to the "need" identified by ANDREONI ET AL. (1998: 856) "for more empirical and
institutional research within jurisdictions outside the U.S.".
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A psychological contract aptly captures the relationship between taxpayers and the tax
authority. As has been pointed out above, careful empirical research has established that it is
more difficult to account for tax compliance in terms of expected punishment. Rather, the
payment of taxes is, as LEVI (1988) calls it, a "quasi-voluntary" act, which is not solely
undertaken because one fears explicit governmental sanctions. ALM ET AL. (1992: 23) refer to
an extensive economic literature7, suggesting that "individuals pay taxes voluntarily." This
does not mean, of course, that threats of explicit punishment play no role, but it draws
attention to other aspects of taxpayers' compliance decisions than those normally considered
in the economics literature.
Many conditions determine the extent to which a psychological contract between taxpayers
and tax authorities exists. An important element is certainly tradition. But when one asks how
such a tradition may have arisen, the amount of trust in the citizens implied by the constitution
is crucial. The more strongly a constitution extends participation rights to its citizens, the
more likely such a psychological tax contract is to emerge.8 A democracy is an institution in
which the citizens are trusted, in the sense that they are given the right to choose their
government in free elections. (Semi-)direct democracies, as they mainly exist in some
American states and at all government levels in Switzerland, go a decisive step further. They
trust their citizens to be able to take reasonable decisions on matters of content.9 As a
consequence, the psychological tax contract, and thus tax morale, is the higher, the more
developed the institutions of direct citizen participation are. This has been empirically shown
using an econometric cross section/time series analysis of 25 Swiss cantons for 1965, 1970
and 1978 (POMMEREHNE and WECK-HANNEMANN 1996, FREY 1997a).10 In these studies,
aggregate tax evasion at the cantonal level is explained by marginal tax rates, income, the
probability of being detected, fines, some socio-demographic indicators like the share of
pensioners and a variable capturing the intensity of direct voter participation. Tax evasion is
Sfr 1500 per taxpayer lower in direct democratic cantons than in others.
                                                
7. E.g. SPICER and LUNDSTEDT (1976), KIM and WALKER (1984), ISAAC, WALKER and THOMAS (1984), ISAAC,
MCCUE and PLOTT (1985), FALKINGER (1991), CULLIS and LEWIS (1997).
8. See more fully FREY (1997a). Related works comprise e.g. ELSTER (1989), ETZIONI (1988), FUKUYAMA
(1995), GAMBETTA (1988), KELMAN (1992), KRAMER and TYLER (1995), MANSBRIDGE (1994), PUTNAM
(1993), SUNSTEIN (1990), TAYLOR (1987), WILSON (1993).
9. Facts are provided in BUTLER and RANNEY (1994). Analytical discussions are provided in e.g. BUDGE
(1996), CRONIN (1989) or FREY (1994). KIRCHGÄSSNER, FELD and SAVIOZ (1999) give an extensive account
of the consequences of direct democracy on economic and social variables.
10. Switzerland consists of 26 cantons. The 26th canton, the canton of Jura, was established in 1977 by secession
from the canton of Berne. Since the data used by POMMEREHNE and WECK-HANNEMANN (1996) and FREY
(1997a) cover the period up to 1978, they could not include data on the canton of Jura in the data set.
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The breach of a psychological contract puts the reciprocal good faith into question. In this
case, empirical evidence (ROBINSON, KRAATZ and ROUSSEAU 1994) clearly indicates that the
parties to the contract perceive that the relationship is transformed into a purely extrinsically
motivated contract. Citizens' tax morale is crowded out11, and individuals take a purely
rationalistic attitude towards tax payment. If the breach of contract results in a complete
crowding out of tax morale, the citizens behave exactly as predicted by the conventional
theory discussed above. Essentially, they refuse to pay taxes (at least under the probability of
being audited and the size of punishment currently administered in countries such as the U.S.
or Switzerland). It follows that particular care must be taken to maintain and protect the
psychological tax contract in a democracy with more extensive formal participation rights. If
the taxpayers feel that the tax authority does not honour the psychological contract, the
resulting change in behaviour towards a purely rationalist attitude is larger than in a purely
representative democracy. In the extreme, in a political system without participation rights, the
psychological contract does not exist at all, and thus there is no scope for any crowding out
effect. Under this condition, the tax authority does not have to treat the citizens respectfully,
but can  rely solely on deterrence.
III. The Respectful Treatment of Taxpayers
To maintain the psychological tax contract, the tax authority must take positive actions to
support it, and negative actions to prevent breach of contract. The basis of any contractual
relationship that relies on trust is the prior belief that the partner in the contract behaves
honestly. The same applies to the psychological contract between tax authorities and
taxpayers: tax authorities suppose that taxpayers will honestly report their true income on the
tax declaration. On the other hand, taxpayers expect to be treated respectfully, as if they are
honestly reporting their true income. A strategy of tax authorities to suspect taxpayers of being
evaders right from the beginning would undermine the psychological contract between
taxpayers and tax authorities. Treating citizens respectfully can be expected to be more
pronounced in polities with constitutional provisions for direct voter participation, like
referenda and initiatives, because both taxpayers and tax authorities know that voters support
public policies, which clearly sustain the public good. In such systems of direct democracy,
taxpayers know that the public services they consume are worth the taxes they pay. Taxpayers
therefore feel obliged to pay their taxes honestly. Tax authorities know that voters could
change tax laws in the political process. Citizens thus have much better possibilities of
expressing their discontent with the tax policy than a quiet and secret violation of the
psychological contract with tax authorities. Even if some groups of voters lose in a
referendum, they comply with tax laws as long as they perceive political outcomes to be the
                                                
11. Crowding theory is more fully developed in FREY (1997b). The experimental and field evidence, including
econometric studies, is summarised in FREY and JEGEN (2000).
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results of fair procedures. This aspect should be less pronounced in representative
democracies where the influence of taxpayers on political outcomes is less direct. These
considerations lead us to the following propositions for direct democracies:
(1) More trust is placed in taxpayers. In particular, when the individual tax returns contain a
mistake, the tax people do not automatically suspect any intention of cheating, but give
the contract partner the benefit of the doubt;
(2) Taxpayers are more respectfully treated as partners in a contract rather than as inferiors in
a hierarchical and bureaucratic relationship;
(3) Taxpayers are less intensely controlled if a "psychological" contract between tax
authorities and taxpayers exists, in order not to undermine the relationship of mutual trust
by distrustful action.
These actions and the corresponding empirically testable propositions should not be
understood in any absolute sense. Rather, it is proposed that they are the more pronounced, the
more extensive the direct participation rights of the citizens are. Differences in the
administration of taxes between the cantons are thus expected to be the result of constitutional
differences. The cantonal constitutions of Switzerland offer different possibilities for direct
voter participation in political decision making. In some cantons, only an obligatory
constitutional referendum is laid down in the constitution. In other cantons, all kinds of
statutory and constitutional referenda and initiatives are possible. Moreover, requirements on
collecting signatures for initiatives and optional (statutory and constitutional) referenda, as
well as the number of days allowed to collect them, vary between cantons. The extent to
which voters may directly participate in the different cantons is measured by an index,
compiled by Stutzer (1999), that varies on a continuum from 1 to 6.12
In order to investigate the relationship between taxpayers and tax authorities, we sent out a
survey to the tax authorities of the 26 Swiss cantons.13 The survey asked detailed questions on
                                                
12. The different signature requirements and numbers of days to collect them in the case of (constitutional and
statutory) initiatives and optional referenda as well as the existence of a mandatory statutory referendum are
translated in an index that has the value of ‘6’ in the case of cantons with strongest political participation
rights and ‘1’ in the case of cantons with weak political participation rights. See STUTZER (1999) für details
on the computation of the index. FREY and STUTZER (2000) have successfully used this index of direct
democracy to account for differences in subjective well-being between cantons.
13. It should be noted that the Swiss cantons have the basic power to tax personal and corporate income, while
the local jurisdictions levy a surcharge on cantonal income taxes. Cantons can, with few restrictions, set tax
rates and define tax bases. Both lead to a strong variation in (effective) tax rates among cantons and among
local jurisdictions. The federal level mainly raises indirect taxes, but also a highly progressive federal income
tax. Tax evasion laws form part of the legal power of the Swiss cantons as well. With the exception of interest
and dividend incomes, which are collected at the federal level at source, Swiss taxpayers do not pay any other
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the legal background of tax evasion, like the use and size of fines, whether an explicit link of
tax payments to the provision of public services is established, the perceived feedback effect
of tax evasion on the level of public services, the intensity of control by tax authorities, the
existence of tax amnesties, whether the tax register is published in a jurisdiction and the
extent of tax indexation. Finally, the survey includes questions on the treatment of taxpayers
by tax authorities in day-to-day audits, in particular when a taxpayer is suspected of not
declaring his or her true taxable income. These questions go into considerable detail. The
legally oriented part of the questionnaire, for example, stresses the differences according to
how severe the tax evasion is, the punishment in case of tax fraud, the period considered and
so on.14 Similarly detailed questions apply to other parts of the survey.15
The way taxpayers are treated by tax authorities reveals interesting differences between the
Swiss cantons. Only 58 per cent of Swiss cantonal tax authorities believe that mistakes in
reported incomes are, on average, in favour of taxpayers. 31 per cent believe that mistakes are
neither to the advantage nor to the disadvantage of taxpayers, and 12 per cent believe that
mistakes are to the disadvantage of taxpayers. This evidence indicates the lack of general
distrust towards taxpayers.
If a taxpayer does not report his or her true taxable income, tax authorities can contact this
person in several ways. 54 per cent of the cantons call this person on the phone and ask how
the mistake(s) occurred in the declaration of income and what explanation the particular
taxpayer has.16 All of the cantons send a letter to the taxpayer, half of them with a standard
formulation. Nearly 85 per cent ask the taxpayer to visit the tax administration office, but only
half of the cantons mention the possibility of punishment. Thus, tax authorities rarely adopt
the strategy of explicit deterrence, but rather seek to gain additional information.
                                                                                                                                                        
withholding taxes. They have to report their incomes regularly (annually or biannually) in a self-assessment
procedure. In addition, firms have less duties to publish their accounts to the fisc than in other OECD
countries. The small extent of withholding taxes increases the ability to evade taxes while restrictions on it by
third party information are smaller than in other countries. See FELD (2000) for a more detailed description of
the Swiss fiscal system.
14. The questionnaire was sent to the chief administrators of the cantonal tax authorities. In addition, we asked
for a specific contact in the authority if there were any clarifying questions. These people usually belonged to
the senior administrative body and in most cases even had a university degree as a lawyer. Casual discussions
on the phone revealed that some chief administrators responded to the questionnaire personally.
15. An English translation of the questionnaire can be obtained from the authors upon request.
16. In the questionnaire, the two dimensions of tax evasion as reporting of too low a gross income and as
overstating cost deductions were treated as one. We asked the opposite however, namely, whether the tax
authorities equally treated reporting too high an income due to mistakes in the addition of figures and
forgetting to deduct usual components.
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96 per cent of the cantonal tax authorities correct reported incomes that are too high, i.e.
reduce taxable incomes in case taxpayers commit mistakes that are to their disadvantage. 27
per cent of the cantonal tax authorities correct reported taxable income even if they fail to
profit from legal tax savings.
Table 1: Respectful Treatment of Taxpayers in Direct and Representative Democratic
Cantons
Dependent Variables Constant Index of
Direct
Democracy
Regional
Dummy
Population 2R
Mistakes in favour of
taxpayers
1.961 –0.406*
(–2.30)
–0.613
(–1.44)
0.001
(0.90)
0.142
Invitation to a Tax Audit 4.301 –0.694(*)
(–1.77)
–1.287
(–1.07)
0.000
(0.21)
0.158
Opening Up the Tax
Register
1.328 –1.033*
(–1.99)
0.190
(0.15)
0.002
(1.29)
0.289
The variable ‘mistakes in favour of taxpayers’ is scaled ‘1’ if the respondent thinks that mistakes are in favour,
‘–1’ if he/she thinks they are to the disadvantage and zero otherwise; the variables ‘invitation...’ and ‘opening
up...’ are dummy variables with a value of ‘1’ if people are invited to the tax authority for a tax audit or the tax
register is opened up, respectively, or zero otherwise. The estimation method is Maximum Likelihood using the
QML (Huber/ White) standard errors and covariances. The numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics of the
estimated parameters. ‘(*)’, ‘*’, or ‘**’ denotes significance at the 90, 95, or 99 percent confidence level,
respectively. McFadden’s R2 are reported in the last column.
There are remarkable differences between direct and representative democratic cantons in the
treatment of taxpayers. The results are reported in Table 1. Tax authorities in cantons with
stronger elements of direct democracy show less distrust towards taxpayers that commit
mistakes in their declarations of taxable income. More directly democratic cantons have a
significantly lower probability of automatically suspecting that mistakes are in general in
favour of taxpayers than more representative democratic cantons.17 This evidence supports
Proposition 1.
                                                
17. The empirical tests are performed employing the GLS regression method for continuous variables, and using
the square root of the cantonal population in the case of average variables and the inverse of the square root
of the cantonal population in the case of sums as a weight. If the dependent variable is a discrete variable
(binary or ordered) Logit estimates are used. In all cases, the robustness of the tests is checked by additionally
introducing a dummy variable, which takes the value one if the canton is a French or Italian speaking canton
and zero otherwise. This is done to check whether observed differences in tax authorities' treatment of
taxpayers between more and less directly democratic cantons simply reflect the differences between the
culturally different language areas. In addition, the size of the cantonal population is introduced in the model.
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Taxpayers declaring too low taxable income have a lower probability of being invited to the
tax administration for a formal tax audit in more directly democratic than in less directly
democratic cantons. This result supports the notion that taxpayers declaring a lower than the
true taxable income are more respectfully treated if a psychological contract exists, something
that is more probable in jurisdictions with higher voter participation rights. This finding is
consistent with Proposition 2.
Does the intensity of control vary among cantons with different constitutional systems? The
intensity of control, as measured by the number of tax investigators to the number of tax
evasion cases varies from 0.02 to 0.78, with a mean of 0.30 and a standard deviation of 0.19.
Interestingly enough, there are no differences in the probability of detection of tax evasion
between more and less directly democratic cantons, whether this control intensity is measured
by the number of tax commissioners per taxpayer, or the number of tax commissioners per
average number of tax evasion or fraud proceedings during recent years. However, control
intensity differs with respect to the possibilities for self-control of the taxpayers by opening up
the tax register. The probability that the tax register is opened up is significantly lower in
direct democratic cantons (when the differences between the language regions are controlled
for).18 This result is consistent with Proposition 3.
IV. Violation of Basic Rules
As mentioned above, a psychological tax contract must be maintained by positive actions
revealing a respectful treatment of taxpayers, but also by negative actions in order to prevent
the breach of the contract. A basic trust of tax authorities with respect to the honesty of
taxpayers and a respectful treatment of taxpayers by the tax authorities must thus be
accompanied by incentives for taxpayers to observe the rules of the game. If honest taxpayers
reporting their true incomes realise that other persons report too little income, they may feel
sucked by those people neglecting the basic rules of citizen duty. These considerations
particularly hold in polities with direct democracy, since those voters who are frustrated about
the uncooperative behaviour of a number of their fellow citizens will express this discontent
strongly at the polls. This leads us to Proposition 4:
(4) Violations of basic rules of the tax code are punished more severely in directly
democratic cantons in order to make clear that the psychological contract is at stake;19
                                                
18. Opening up the tax register means that citizens at the cantonal or local level can have insight into the tax
register. It is publicly available in the tax administration to the citizens of a jurisdiction in some cantons.
19. Experimental research has clearly established that the willingness to contribute to a public good breaks down
when people feel taken advantage of. See FELD, HART and OSTMANN (1996). In the case of taxation, see
SPICER (1988). In a similar context, LEWIS (1982) emphasizes that perceived inequity may be a reason for tax
evasion. The severe punishment of violations of basic rules may be a means to reduce perceived inequity.
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Our survey contains several questions about the treatment of taxpayers by the tax authorities
with respect to the quality of personal interactions. The results are reported in the upper part
of Table 2. Taxpayers who do not submit their tax declarations are fined more heavily in more
directly democratic cantons than in less directly democratic ones. Such persons do not comply
with the basic obligation of taxpaying and are more severely fined in order to deter them from
showing no interest in maintaining the public good. On the other hand, more directly
democratic cantons have a higher probability than less directly democratic cantons of offering
the same legal objection possibilities to those people with no declaration of taxable income as
those with self-declaration of incomes. This again indicates that even taxpayers who do not
submit a declaration of their taxable income are treated more respectfully in more directly
democratic jurisdictions than in less directly democratic ones.
Table 2: The Treatment of Violations of the Tax Code in Direct and Representative
Democratic Cantons
Dependent Variables Constant Index of
Direct
Democracy
Regional
Dummy
Population 2R
Fine for Lack of
Submission of Tax
Declaration
–4216.89 1942.74*
(2.70)
3733.31(*)
(2.00)
–0.881
(0.17)
0.378
Legal Objection
Possibilities in the
Case of  No
Declaration
–9.183 1.949*
(2.25)
2.582
(1.38)
0.001
(0.86)
0.300
Maximum Fines 653.87 –79.144(*)
(–1.85)
53.424
(0.61)
–0.011
(–0.17)
0.122
Fines in the Case of
Self-Denunciation
52.425 –8.969(*)
(–1.80)
–18.023
(–1.33)
0.030
(1.02)
0.251
The variables ‘maximum fines’ and ‘fines in the case of self-denunciation’ are continuous variables indicating
the multiple of the amount evaded that has to be paid as a fine, while the variable ‘fine for lack of submission of
tax declaration’ is the absolute amount in Sfr. The variable ‘legal objection possibilities ...’ is a dummy variable
with a value of ‘1’ if legal objection possibilities in the case of no declaration are the same as in the case of self
declaration with tax evasion, and zero otherwise. With the exception of legal objection possibilities in which
Maximum Likelihood estimates are reported again using QML (Huber/ White) standard errors and covariances,
the remaining estimates are derived by GLS. The numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics of the estimated
parameters. ‘(*)’, ‘*’, or ‘**’ denotes significance at the 90, 95, or 99 percent confidence level, respectively.
The last column reports adjusted R2 (corrected by the degrees of freedom) and in the case of legal objection
possibilities McFadden’s R2.
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V. Minor Violations of the Tax Code
Nobody is perfect, and to cheat a little bit on taxes is a common and minor human weakness,
and should be considered as such. Such minor violations should not be interpreted as an
action intended to breach the psychological contract. An exaggerated punishment of minor
violations of the tax code is interpreted as an inadequate reaction by the public authorities.
The tolerance for such minor human weaknesses is indeed reflected in political systems with
direct voter participation in the political process. Taxpayers vote for low punishment of minor
violations of the tax code, acknowledging that nobody is perfect and that everyone is liable to
commit small mistakes. This reasoning leads us to Proposition (5):
(5) Minor violations of the tax code are punished less severely in direct democratic cantons.
The Swiss cantonal tax authorities' answers reveal quite a strong variation in their treatment of
tax evasion. For example, the minimum fine in the case of tax evasion varies between zero
and 100 per cent of true tax payment, with a mean of 28 per cent and a standard deviation of
21, while the maximum rate varies from 100 per cent to 1000 per cent of the true tax payment,
with a mean of 344 per cent and a standard deviation of 163. The fines in the case of tax fraud
vary accordingly. The corresponding estimates are reported in the lower part of Table 2. With
respect to fines, we obtain significantly lower maximum fines for tax evasion in more direct
democratic cantons (while French and Italian speaking cantons do not have significantly
different maximum fines). In the case of self-denunciation, the fines are lower in cantons with
more voter participation possibilities. All in all, tax evasion tends to be less heavily fined in
direct democratic cantons. These tests thus provide (limited) empirical support for
Proposition 5.
VI. A Synthesis
Tax compliance is not simply the result of opportunities to evade tax and the deterrence and
prevention strategies of tax authorities. Tax compliance to a considerable extent has to be
attributed to tax morale of taxpayers. If that were not so, given the current deterrence
measures in most countries, in particular the U.S. and Switzerland, a rational taxpayer would
not have any incentive to abstain from tax evasion. Tax morale, on the other hand, is not
simply the result of one's upbringing. It depends on the interaction of taxpayers with tax
authorities, on the legal framework, and on the constitutional environment. In this paper, the
interaction of taxpayers with tax authorities is analysed and linked to constitutional
differences between Swiss cantons, in particular the opportunities the cantonal constitutions
offer to the voters to directly participate in referenda and initiatives.
On the basis of the political process via results of a survey among the 26 cantonal tax
authorities, it turns out that the tax authorities of cantons with more direct participation rights,
- 13 -
compared to cantons with less direct democracy, are less suspicious if taxpayers report too
low incomes. They treat taxpayers more respectfully. Persons who do not submit their tax
declarations, indicating that they do not comply with the basic rules of the game, are more
heavily fined in direct democratic cantons. Tax evasion is fined with lower rates. Thus, in
direct democracy, minor violations of the tax code are punished less severely than major
violations. All in all, respectful treatment and trust are accompanied by generosity in the case
of minor human weaknesses, but strong deterrence if the psychological tax contract is at stake.
The analysis suggests that there is an implicit psychological contract between taxpayers and
tax authorities in Switzerland. This holds in particular if voters are directly involved in
political decision-making. The psychological contract is based on a relationship of trust.
- 14 -
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